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“I Am Better At Narrative Than  
Analytic History”: Schlegel’s Version of 
Intellectual History 
G. EDWARD WHITE 
It has been a stimulating and exhausting task to reread 
much of John Henry Schlegel’s efforts, over several decades, 
to work out his approach to doing history generally and 
intellectual history in particular.1 That topic by no means 
captures all of Schlegel’s scholarly pursuits—he has written 
an astonishing amount on a variety of subjects since entering 
the legal academy in the 1970s2—but I believe it to be central 
to his search for a scholarly identity. All of us in the academy 
engage in such searches, and among the goals of the searches 
is figuring out one’s strengths and weaknesses as a scholar 
and matching them up with topics whose pursuit serves to 
maximize strengths. So I have tried to follow Schlegel along 
as he came to the conclusion that he was “better at narrative  
  
 
 1. I am indebted to Fred Konefsky for pointing me in the direction of some 
of those sources. Thanks to Fred and to Neil Duxbury for comments on an earlier 
draft of this Article. 
 2. See John Henry Schlegel, Cirriculum Vita, UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO 
SCHOOL OF LAW (2020) at 2, http://www.law.buffalo.edu/content/dam/law/ 
restricted-assets/pdf/faculty/cv/schlegel_john_cv.pdf. 
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than analytic history.”3 Sometimes I found following him 
inspiring, and sometimes mentally tiring, and those 
reactions were often connected.  
I am seeking to pursue two inquiries in this meditation 
on Schlegel. One is to try to figure out why he settled, fairly 
soon after concluding that he was attracted to legal history, 
on a particular conception of history in general, and of 
intellectual history in particular, that he continued to defend 
after others pointed out obvious difficulties with it. The other 
is to analyze one of Schlegel’s most successful applications, 
in my view, of his methodology, his 1984 article on the 
formation of the Critical Legal Studies movement in the late 
1970s.4 After pursuing those inquiries, I will close with some 
general observations about Schlegel’s contributions as a 
scholar.  
I 
Schlegel graduated from the University of Chicago Law 
School in 1967 (a native of Mattoon, Illinois, he received a 
B.A. three years earlier from Northwestern) and spent the 
next year as a Teaching Fellow at Stanford.5 He had done 
well in law school and perhaps had been inclined to 
immediately seek an academic position, but in 1968 he took 
a job as an attorney with the Legal Aid Society of Chicago, 
where he remained until 1973, when he joined the Buffalo 
faculty.6 I have not been able to find, among the numerous 
comments Schlegel has made about his  career decisions, any 
indication of when and how he first got interested in doing 
 
 3. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 13 (1995).  
 4. John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and 
Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
391 (1984). 
 5. SCHLEGEL, supra note 2, at 1. 
 6. Id. 
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scholarship in legal history.7 He had no graduate training in 
history, and was not part of an expanding circle of persons in 
the early 1970s who had connections to a faculty-student 
legal history workshop at Harvard, several of whose 
members were hired as legal historians by law schools in the 
1970s.8 As far as I can determine, his course offerings at 
Buffalo during the 47 years in which he has been a member 
of the faculty have centered almost exclusively in the 
commercial arena: Contracts, Commercial Law, 
Corporations, and Corporate Finance.  
But as early as 1979, Schlegel had produced the first of 
two articles,9 which were eventually incorporated into a 
book, on Legal Realism and empirical social science. The 
articles made it clear that he had become deeply immersed 
in a particular version of legal history. Both of those articles 
sought to answer two historical questions Schlegel thought 
to be interconnected. The first was “[w]hy did law not become 
 
 7. Even Schlegel’s “notes” for the conference for which this Essay was 
prepared, although they purported to give an “easy” answer to the question why 
“[m]ost of what I have written . . . has been an effort to use history, including 
contemporary history . . . as tools to understand why legal education and 
educators, legal theory and legal practices are so strange,” didn’t give anything 
like an answer, let alone an easy one. Jack Schlegel, Having Serious Fun – 
History/Ideas/Law: Notes by Jack Schlegel, UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO: THE BALDY 
CENTER FOR LAW & SOCIAL POLICY (2021), http://www.buffalo.edu/baldycenter/ 
events/conferences/Schlegel.html. All Schlegel said on the matter was that he had 
been bored in law school because the doctrines he was taught didn’t seem to have 
anything to do with the way law actually functioned; that he began to learn about 
Legal Realism as a law student, “mainly on my own,” which reinforced an interest 
in “how law operated”; and that that interest was reinforced by exposure to the 
law and society movement, the first of the “law and” movements in the legal 
academy in the late 1960s. Id. But the law and society scholars at the time were 
doing law and sociology, not legal history.  
 8. For more detail on that cohort of American legal historians, whose entry 
into the legal academy in the 1970s signaled a renaissance in legal history on law 
school faculties, see G. Edward White, The Origins of Modern American Legal 
History, in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: LAW, IDEOLOGY AND 
METHODS 48, 48 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy, eds., 2010).  
 9. John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social 
Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459 (1979); John Henry 
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular 
Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195 (1980). 
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a scientific study, in the twentieth-century sense of science 
as an empirical inquiry into a world ‘out there,’ as did all the 
other disciplines in American academic life that formed in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?”10 The 
second was why American Legal Realism “as a coherent 
intellectual force in American legal thought [ ] simply ran 
itself into the sand.”11 
Schlegel later said that he started thinking about those 
questions when, in the spring of 1974, he “chanced on some 
old files that once belonged to Charles E. Clark,” a professor 
at and subsequently Dean of Yale Law School, and 
“discovered a story worth telling.”12 The story was about 
Clark’s and his colleague William O. Douglas’s efforts to use 
techniques of empirical social science to reform legal 
doctrines in the 1920s and early 1930s. By the time Schlegel 
encountered Clark’s files, he had read some books on 
Realism,13 and he believed that Clark’s files could help him 
capture a dimension of Realism that those works had not 
emphasized, namely the persistent interest in some scholars 
associated with the Realist movement in conceiving law as a 
social science featuring empiricist methodologies.14 
Eventually Schlegel’s pursuit of that dimension of Realism 
would result in his engaging in close studies, based largely 
on archival research, of the work of not only Clark and 
Douglas but Underhill Moore, Walter Wheeler Cook, 
Herman Oliphant, Leon Marshal, and Hessel Yntema. 
Schlegel’s archival work not only sought to show what 
individual Realist scholars were seeking to do in launching 
 
 10. SCHLEGEL, supra note 3, at 1. 
 11. Id. at 2. Versions of Schlegel’s 1979 and 1980 Buffalo Law Review articles 
became chapters in this book.  
 12. Id. at 1. 
 13. Id. at 5–6 (noting WILFRED E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 
(1968); EDWARD PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973); and 
WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973)). 
 14. SCHLEGEL, supra note 3, at 8. 
2021] SCHLEGEL’S INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 187 
their projects—the data they were attempting to gather, the 
uses to which they sought to put that data, and the overall 
purposes of their academic endeavors—but who those 
scholars were—their professional contacts, friendships, and 
animosities, their relationships with colleagues and 
institutions, even, when allegedly relevant, incidents from 
their personal lives. Schlegel’s experiences doing archival 
work on Realist scholars convinced him of two things about 
their ideas. One was that those ideas could not be understood 
independently of the “context” in which they were situated. 
By “context” Schlegel meant, essentially, everything that 
was going on around the Realist scholars as they worked on 
their projects: the economic climate of legal institutions in 
the 1920s (flush) and the 1930s (depressed); the politics of 
the law schools with which they were affiliated and their 
competitor schools; incidents in their personal lives; and 
their own idiosyncratic personalities. American Legal 
Realism, for Schlegel, ended up being the aggregate of what 
“Realist” scholars did and who they were. And the eventual 
running of the Realist movement into the sand came when 
the promise of its empiricist methodologies failed to produce 
work that the legal academy or legal profession generally 
found useful, a failure that was as much a product of the 
human limitations of Realist scholars as it was of 
methodological weaknesses.  
Schlegel emerged from his immersion in archival sources 
with a conviction that understanding legal ideas required an 
understanding of the persons who articulated those ideas 
and the connections of those persons to other persons, 
institutions, and the larger culture in which they lived and 
worked. That meant, for him, that “intellectual history” 
could not be merely “the history of ideas,” because ideas 
always had contexts, and contexts mattered.15 The result, in 
Schlegel’s 1979 and 1980 Buffalo Law Review articles and 
the book on which they were based, were narratives of the 
 
 15. Id. at 4–5. 
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relationship of Realism to empirical social science in which, 
as Schlegel’s longtime colleague Alfred Konefsky once put it, 
“ideas and people” were “hopelessly intermingled.” 16 
Schlegel might have chosen to treat his conception of 
intellectual history as only based on the largely 
uncontroversial assumption that ideas are invariably 
situated in contexts, so that understanding them requires 
attention to those contexts. Absent some unreconstructed 
disciples of Leo Strauss,17 I doubt most contemporary 
academic theorists would maintain that ideas are timeless, 
being handed down over generations in a great chain of 
being. But Schlegel has taken a more aggressive position on 
intellectual history, characterizing it as “not the history of 
ideas” but “the history of the intellectuals or other thinkers 
and writers who made those cultural products we call 
‘thought.’”18 Elsewhere he has suggested that “intellectual 
history, as traditionally understood as a history of ideas 
embodied in texts, is an essentially empty exercise.”19  
For reasons I will subsequently set forth, I think that the 
characterization of intellectual history Schlegel advances 
cannot sensibly be maintained. But before detailing those 
reasons I want to take up two additional features of 
Schlegel’s characterization. One is that it rests on a 
distinctive conception not just of intellectual history, but of 
history itself. The other, which requires a more extended 
discussion, involves Schlegel’s successive efforts to refine his 
characterization in response to alternative conceptions of 
 
 16. Id. at 12. Schlegel’s response to Konefsky’s comment was “I do this 
because, in my experience, ideas and people are usually hopelessly intermingled.” 
Id. He went further in the “Afterword” stating that “[i]t is time that we consider 
giving up the history of ideas, giving up intellectual history as a history of the 
ideas of humans set apart from the rest of their lived experience, and to begin to 
write the history of intellectuals.” Id. at 260. 
 17. See LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953) (illustrating 
Strauss’s view of the relationship of ideas to history). 
 18. SCHLEGEL, supra note 3, at 12. 
 19. Id. at 4.  
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intellectual history, efforts I find, as I previously indicated, 
simultaneously inspiring and exhausting.  
In a response to a critical review of American Legal 
Realism and Empirical Social Science in the Yale Journal of 
Law & Humanities, Schlegel made some general 
observations on history that I take to be driving his view of 
intellectual history. He said: 
We do ourselves ill by not recognizing the context in which we live 
and work and then measuring our lives by that context. To wish to 
measure ourselves by some context that we neither live in nor can 
recreate is that ultimate act of ahistoricity by an intellectual 
historian. . . .  
 . . . As best as I can tell there is no truth, only an absence of lies. 
Though there are dozens of ways to recount the story that reaches 
this conclusion, I would begin with the observation that the 
Reformation killed the truth of revelation mediated by the Church 
Universal. The Enlightenment killed the Reformation’s 
understanding of truth as revelation directly accessible to the 
believer. And the horrors associated with World War II killed the 
Enlightenment’s notion of truth as revelation accessible through 
reason alone. There is no longer (nor ever was there) a 
transcendental, transpersonal, transhistorical basis for our value 
judgments. We make them all up. 
 . . . My stories, my heroes, my valuable ideas are my attempt to 
suggest, in the only way I as an historian know how, what stories 
are important . . . which ideas are worth taking seriously. In aid of 
this activity I have nothing but verisimilitude, a range of experience 
hopefully shared with my readers, and the possibility that others 
share or can be persuaded to share my values. 
. . . As an author I ask others to consider whether by their own 
lights . . .  my stories are illuminating of a time past . . . the ideas I 
value were useful for something at a time past.20 
The crucial point of that excerpt, for me, is that it negates 
a view of history as containing kernels of truth. Truth is not 
only not “transcendental,” it is not “transpersonal.” Humans 
“make up” truth in their value judgments. That can only 
mean that the role of the intellectual historian is not to 
 
 20. John Henry Schlegel, No Lever and No Place to Stand (A Response to 
Christopher Shannon), 8 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 513, 514 (1996). 
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introduce readers to the “truth” of historical ideas, but to 
persuade them, by recreating their context so as to achieve 
“verisimilitude,” that the ideas were useful to 
contemporaries in a past time. And that, for Schlegel, 
necessarily means a full recreation of the context of past 
ideas so that readers from a different time period get a sense 
of why they might have been thought to be useful and 
appealing. When one adds to that corollary from Schlegel’s 
general view of truth in history his conviction that ideas are 
the products of the collective thought of people who happened 
to be “intellectuals or other thinkers and writers” at points 
in time, one can understand how he reached the conclusion 
that intellectual history cannot be equated with the history 
of ideas per se.  
Beginning in the late 1980s, Schlegel began to advance 
his conception of intellectual history in a series of ambitious 
book reviews. All of those reviews were actually essays in 
which Schlegel dipped in and out of consideration of the book 
in question to explore a number of other topics and works. It 
is those digressions that I find both stimulating and 
exhausting. One sits by Schlegel as he traces his engagement 
with a variety of issues that attracted scholars on the 
intellectual left of the American legal academy in the 1970s 
and 1980s, particularly those who had connected in some 
fashion with Critical Legal Studies. I found myself impressed 
with the depth of Schlegel’s grasp of the issues, and of the 
contributions of other scholars to understanding them. But I 
also repeatedly wished that Schlegel would summarize the 
point of his digressions and get back to addressing the book 
under review.21 
 
 21. My impatience was accentuated by Schlegel’s writing style. Schlegel is one 
of the gifted writers in the legal academy. When he chooses to, he can be 
delightfully pointed or funny, and his self-assessment that he is very good at 
telling stories is correct. But he also likes to remind his readers just how 
complicated, and often unresolvable, certain “big” issues are, and he often does 
that through conversations with himself on paper in which he drives deeper and 
deeper into a subject, spinning out arguments and counterarguments along the 
way. For just one illustration, see Schlegel’s discussion of epistemology, 
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The books Schlegel reviewed, between 1989 and 1997, 
were three of the most prominent works in legal history to 
appear in that time period: Laura Kalman’s Legal Realism 
at Yale, 1927-1960;22 Morton Horwitz’s The Transformation 
of American Law, 1870-1960;23 and Neil Duxbury’s Patterns 
of American Jurisprudence.24 He made use of all of the 
reviews to set forth his conception of intellectual history. The 
Kalman review stressed “the importance of fully socializing 
intellectual history” by understanding that “changes in the 
cast of characters” articulating ideas “suggest that ideas had 
taken on new emphasis or meaning.”25 In the Horwitz review 
Schlegel asserted that the work of scholars “gains meaning 
for them in (and from) the web of social relations in which 
they find (and place) themselves. . . . [I]t is here that life is 
predominantly lived and so it is here, as a rule, historical 
inquiry ought to start.”26 And in the Duxbury review Schlegel 
noted that  
When one leaves the cloistered halls of intellectual history proper 
and examines biographies of participants in the high culture of the 
North Atlantic . . . one sees people doing things other than thinking 
 
linguistics, literary theory, and the “hermeneutic circle” in his review of LAURA 
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960. John Henry Schlegel, The Ten 
Thousand Dollar Question, 41 STAN. L. REV. 435, 442–53 (1989). Although 
Schlegel began that discussion by claiming that it was a starting place for an 
argument “about doing intellectual history generally,” id. at 442, and concluded 
it with the observation that “understanding fully the culture of other thinkers’ 
doing and thinking, is the key to understanding an intellectual text,” id. at 453, 
most of the discussion amounts to a very high-grade primer setting forth what 
Schlegel gleaned from investigating the contributions of philosophers, linguists, 
and literary theorists. And what Schlegel gleaned seemed to have simply 
reinforced his view about what intellectual history actually consisted of. 
 22. Schlegel, supra note 21.  
 23. John Henry Schlegel, A Tasty Tidbit, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1045 (1993) 
(reviewing MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960 (1992)). 
 24. John Henry Schlegel, Does Duncan Kennedy Wear Briefs or Boxers?, 45 
BUFF. L. REV. 277 (1997) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE (1995)). 
 25. Schlegel, supra note 21, at 464–65. 
 26. Schlegel, supra note 23, at 1057–58.  
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or writing. One sees them falling in love, coping with families, 
fighting with institutions or colleagues, enjoying friends, teaching, 
moving about; in other words they can be found living and dying. . . . 
Yet [biography] falls by the wayside when it comes to the generic 
category “intellectuals” . . . Why do intellectual historians persist in 
seeing the world in this way?27 
In Duxbury’s account of “patterns” in late nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century American jurisprudence, Schlegel 
complained, “plenty of names” are mentioned, but “there are 
no people, no places and no institutions described,” and thus 
“no reasons for anyone to say what they are saying.”28 In 
short, no “context” in Schlegelian terms: Duxbury’s account 
was a history of ideas rather than a history of intellectuals.  
By the appearance of Schlegel’s review of Duxbury, 
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science had 
been published, and Duxbury had reviewed it.29 A 
correspondence between Duxbury and Schlegel followed, and 
Duxbury urged Schlegel to use the occasion of reviewing 
Patterns of American Jurisprudence to clarify his views on 
the practice of intellectual history.30 Duxbury’s review had 
criticized Schlegel for failing sufficiently to meet what 
Schlegel apparently believed was the central goal of 
intellectual history: “the need to place . . . ideas . . . in their 
full personal, social, and intellectual context.”31 The failure 
had two dimensions. One was that Schlegel’s conception of 
“context” was seemingly so broad that “[i]ntellectual 
historians . . . must take everything into account—even, it 
seems, that which is unaccountable.”32 Duxbury 
particularized: 
The writing of history requires that certain facts be considered more 
important than others and that some things be treated as 
 
 27. Schlegel, supra note 24, at 279–80.  
 28. Id. at 292. 
 29. Neil Duxbury, Legal Realism for Legal Realists, 9 RATIO JURIS 198 (1996).  
 30. Schlegel, supra note 24, at 280 n.10.  
 31. Duxbury, supra note 29, at 201. 
 32. Id. at 203.  
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irrelevant. Even if it were possible to place ideas “in their full 
personal, social, and intellectual context”—and I do not believe for 
one moment this is possible—the result, I suspect, would be rather 
laborious and indiscriminate story-telling.33  
Only Schlegel’s narrative gifts, Duxbury concluded, had 
resulted in American Legal Realism and Empirical Social 
Science being a book that was “anything but dull.”34 
Duxbury’s second concern with Schlegel’s approach was 
arguably even more telling. Schlegel’s version of intellectual 
history, he suggested, did not “connect context with ideas.”35 
Schlegel claimed that intellectual history needed to be “the 
history of intellectuals, people who do things with ideas.”36 
But in Duxbury’s view intellectual history needed to be 
“more than that: It needs to account for what those people 
actually attempt to achieve with their ideas; it ought also to 
take account of how those ideas affect others.”37 But “ideas 
hardly feature throughout Schlegel’s book.”38 For Duxbury, 
Schlegel’s particular method of contextualizing ideas had the 
effect of reducing the ideas to insignificance. That 
consequence seemed notably ironic when Schlegel had 
defined his project as an effort to connect up two “ideas” that 
at one point occupied a prominent place in American legal 
history, “Realism” as a jurisprudential approach and 
“empirical social science” as a methodology.39 How could one 
adequately explore that connection without making some 
effort to understand what the ideas meant to persons 
enthusiastic about them and what was the source of their 
enthusiasm? But, as Duxbury notes, when Schlegel 
“discusses what certain realists actually thought about law—
 
 33. Id. (citation omitted). 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 201. 
 36. Id. (citation omitted). 
 37. Id. at 201–02. 
 38. Id. at 202.  
 39. SCHLEGEL, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
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as opposed to how they tended to fill their days—he seems 
peculiarly ill at ease with, even disinterested in his subject 
matter.”40  
It is intriguing to me that, in the face of Duxbury’s 
criticism, which other reviewers of American Legal Realism 
and Empirical Social Science had made as well,41 Schlegel 
simply chose to double down on his view of how intellectual 
history ought to be practiced. He insisted, in the Duxbury 
review, on the same proposition about intellectual history 
that he had advanced in the Kalman and Horwitz reviews, 
that intellectual history as “the history of ideas” was an 
“essentially empty exercise” because people, places, and 
institutions were left out of that history.42 It strikes me as 
rather bizarre that the same person who is clearly inclined 
to delve deep into texts in an effort to make sense of the ideas 
expressed in them—a practice of Schlegel that can readily be 
seen in his lengthy, detailed digressions to consider a variety 
of texts in the Kalman, Horwitz, and Duxbury reviews—
would then assert that texts containing ideas are 
meaningless without being placed in their “full context.” 
What was the point of Schlegel’s reading the texts in the first 
place? Surely he was not treating Richard Rorty’s Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature as interchangeable with an 
instruction manual for a washer/dryer.  
Not all ideas are interchangeable; some ideas have been 
treated as “worth more” than others by communities over 
time. A history of those ideas, as Duxbury suggests, should 
investigate not only why those ideas were regarded as 
important at various times but what they were. That 
investigation seems central to what intellectual history is 
about: why would one even think of intellectual history as a 
viable subfield unless one believed that identifying and 
 
 40. Duxbury, supra note 29, at 202. 
 41. See, e.g., James E. Herget, Book Reviews, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 396, 398 
(1995). 
 42. See Schlegel, supra note 24. 
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analyzing influential ideas over time was a coherent and 
useful exercise? And why would Schlegel dismiss that 
exercise as a methodological practice when he engages in it 
himself? 
I think the last question can partially be answered by 
noting Schlegel’s self-description of himself as “pigheaded” 
and by his penchant for playing the role of a provocateur. It 
may be that when Schlegel first became attracted to 
intellectual history in connection with the project that 
eventually resulted in American Legal Realism and 
Empirical Social Science,  he was put off by what he felt was 
the “idealist” character of much intellectual history 
scholarship, which may have appeared to him to be 
privileging the causal weight of ideas in history (as opposed 
to materialist causes) and devoting an insufficient attention 
to the sociological dimensions of knowledge. That reaction 
would have been consistent with someone attracted to leftist 
social theory and leftist politics in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, when social historians were seeking to marginalize 
intellectual historians in American history departments. So 
it is possible that Schlegel began his work on the early 
twentieth-century connections between Realism and 
empirical social science as something of a social historian, 
determined to “contextualize” ideas he felt had been 
simultaneously treated in a vacuum and given too much 
causal power. Shifting his focus from the content of ideas to 
the people expressing them, and the places and institutions 
in which they were expressed, was a form of social historian 
strategy. 
But having done that, Schlegel then chose to express that 
strategy in the form of a polemical statement that 
intellectual history was the “history or intellectuals” and 
nothing else, and, when confronted with the entirely 
intuitive rejoinder that one could hardly practice intellectual 
history without devoting at least some attention to the 
content and influence of certain ideas, to repeat his polemics. 
He may have taken some comfort in doing so from his belief, 
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previously quoted, that there is no epistemological “lever” or 
“place to stand” from which one derives one’s methodological 
and philosophical convictions; one just “makes them up” from 
a sense that one is right.43 If so, what others perceive as 
grave limitations on Schlegel’s view of intellectual history 
does not provide a coherent reason for dismissing it. But it 
may also simply be that Schlegel has been aware that his 
polemics about intellectual history are bound to provoke, and 
rather enjoys that. 
II 
Suffice it to say that I am among the ranks of those 
inclined to treat Schlegel’s polemical description of what 
intellectual history is and is not as “serious fun,” meaning 
that he would enjoy defending it and critiquing “history of 
ideas” enthusiasts along the way, but that in the end he 
seems content to rest in the (possibly obfuscating) posture of 
liking stories and being better at narrative than analytic 
history. I now want to turn to one of the best-known 
illustrations of Schlegel’s narrative history, one that draws 
heavily on the people, places, and institutions he thinks play 
a vital part in the “history of intellectuals.” The illustration 
is Schlegel’s 1984 article in a symposium on Critical Legal 
Studies in the Stanford Law Review.44  
One can get a sense of Schlegel’s “narrative history” 
perspective just from the title of the article. He called it 
“Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate 
History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies.” First, 
“notes toward,” together with “intimate,” suggesting that 
Schlegel’s “history” consisted of impressions by a participant 
observer, not really a history at all.45 Second, “opinionated 
 
 43. See infra note 20. 
 44. Schlegel, supra note 4. 
 45. A suggestion reinforced by Schlegel’s writing, on the first page of the 
article, that “the notion of my writing the history of an organization now about 
seven years old . . . is clearly ridiculous.” Id. at 391. 
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and affectionate,” suggesting that although Schlegel’s 
“history” was written from a reservoir of goodwill toward his 
subject, it was at bottom just those impressions, often 
reflecting his idiosyncratic concerns. Finally, a history not of 
Critical Legal Studies as a legal “movement,” such as 
Realism, or as a set of ideas (by 1984 Schlegel had already 
staked out his aversion to histories of ideas), but of the 
Conference on Critical Legal Studies, which Schlegel 
characterized as a “legal organization.”46 An institutional 
history, perhaps, or a history of the people who formed and 
administered the Conference, or the places where the 
Conference was held, but very likely not a history of the ideas 
generated and discussed at Conferences.  
The last point was reinforced quite early in the article, 
when, after a brief explanation of how the founding of the 
Conference arose out of a meeting between Duncan Kennedy 
and David Trubek in Cambridge in the 1976-77 academic 
year,47 Schlegel turned to a commentary on the ideas 
discussed at the Conference’s early meetings, the first of 
which took place in Madison, Wisconsin in the spring of 
1977.48 Kennedy, who had joined the Harvard faculty in 
1971, was  doing work in American intellectual history from 
a perspective Schlegel called “Critical Marxism,” which 
emphasized “the indeterminacy of social circumstances, and 
thus the impossibility of deriving intelligible laws of 
historical change, economic or otherwise.”49 Trubek, on the 
Wisconsin faculty after having been denied tenure at Yale in 
1973, had lost enthusiasm for the “law and development” 
movement, which sought to infuse third-world nations with 
“progressive” western legal values, and moved to a more 
chastened posture that retained enthusiasm for law and 
social science but eschewed what Schlegel called “Orthodox” 
 
 46. Id. at 392. 
 47. Id. at 392–95.  
 48. Id. at 398 n.25. 
 49. Id. at 393 n.9.  
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or “Scientific” Marxism and its focus on a “labor theory of 
value” and reform of “class-based ownership of the means of 
production.”50 Kennedy and Trubek had in common leftist 
politics, but more importantly, from Schlegel’s perspective, 
the “seductiveness of a revivalist preacher” (Kennedy) and 
ability to “make[ ]and maintain[ ] alliances with consummate 
ease” (Trubek). 51 They were thus well suited to found a new 
organization of legal academics, as well as having migrated 
from a teacher/student relationship when Trubek had 
Kennedy in a class at Yale to a close friendship.52 
Kennedy’s and Trubek’s formation of the Conference 
stemmed from their mutual interest in bringing together an 
existing group of legal academics identified with the law and 
society movement and a new group of leftist-leaning scholars 
who had entered the legal academy in the 1970s.53 Their 
goals in bringing those two groups together were to signal 
the appreciation of the younger group for their elders’ having 
deviated from traditional ways of legal scholarship and 
teaching to explore the gap between “law on the books” and 
“law in action,” and at the same time to subject law and 
society scholars to critical assessments of their starting 
intellectual premises.54 Initially Kennedy and Trubek seem 
to have contemplated a “neat binary form” to the Conference 
in which law and society types would engage with varieties 
of Critical Marxists.55 
At this point in Schlegel’s narrative one gets a clear 
sense of that narrative’s priorities. He takes up, first, the 
actual groups which emerged at the early conferences, and, 
second, the principal perspectives exhibited by attendees in 
group discussions. The “binary form” of discussion 
 
 50. Id. at 393 & n.9. 
 51. Id. at 392. 
 52. Id. at 393. 
 53. Id. at 394–95. 
 54. Id. at 395. 
 55. Id. at 394–96. 
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anticipated by Kennedy and Trubek was immediately 
destroyed by two of Schlegel’s core variables in the history of 
intellectuals: place and people.56 Because the first 
Conference was at Madison, Wisconsin, Trubek was its 
principal organizer, and he recruited Mark Tushnet, at that 
time Associate Dean of the law faculty, who “had a secretary 
and easy access to duplicating facilities and other amenities 
without which organizing a large meeting is impossible.”57 It 
was Tushnet, in a January, 1977 letter inviting people to the 
first Conference, who indicated that the younger 
participants, while indebted to their law and social science 
colleagues, “had chosen a path quite different from that of 
their teachers.”58 But Tushnet, at the time he wrote the 
letter, was a “Scientific Marxist,” ensuring that a third 
perspective would be voiced in Conference discussions.59 It 
was fortuitous that the Conference was held at Wisconsin 
because Trubek was on the faculty; it was fortuitous that 
Tushnet became an organizer and participant in the 
Conference because he was Trubek’s colleague and Associate 
Dean; and it was fortuitous that Tushnet’s then ideological 
perspective was neither non-Marxist law and social science 
nor Critical Marxism.  
Schlegel then describes the interplay between the three 
“leftist perspective[s]” which “achieved prominence” within 
the Conference. He characterizes that interplay as a “game” 
of “three-corner catch.”60 Most of the law and social science 
types attending the Conference were not sympathetic to 
Marxism as they understood it, and in that respect found 
allies in Critical Marxists, who were not interested in issues 
such as a labor theory of value and class ownership of the 
 
 56. Id. at 396. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 395.  
 59. Id. at 396. 
 60. Id. at 397. 
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means of production.61 On the other hand, Scientific 
Marxists and law and social science enthusiasts shared a 
“great emphasis on material culture,” as distinguished from 
the Critical Marxists’ arguably “idealist” interest in ideas.62 
Finally, both Critical and Scientific Marxists believed that 
“the evil in the world is capitalism,” and were thus dismissive 
of what they took to be the non-Marxist law and social 
science adherents’ “apologetics” for a capitalist-based social 
and economic order in America.63 And thus around the room 
the ball is tossed,” Schlegel concluded.64 Hardly a conclusion 
designed to attach any defining ideological identity to the 
Conference. Moreover, Schlegel made no effort to suggest 
where the ideas being tossed around in three-cornered catch 
had come from, or why they might have been attractive to 
the persons at the Conference who endorsed them. That is a 
point to which I will later return.  
And yet there was a sense in which, from its origins, the 
Conference on Critical Legal Studies was ideological: certain 
types of legal academics were not invited to it. One was what 
Schlegel calls “doctrinaire Marxists referred to as ‘Guild 
types’”;65 the other was “prominent liberals.”66 The first 
group was excluded because the Conference’s organizers felt 
 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 399. The reference is to the National Lawyers’ Guild, an 
organization of practitioners, many of them engaged in the representation of 
labor unions, that was founded in the 1920s as an alternative to the American 
Bar Association. Several members of the Lawyers’ Guild were also members of 
the Communist Party of the United States in the 1930s. The group was 
investigated by the FBI and the House Un-American Activities Committee in the 
1940s. The image of members of the National Lawyers’ Guild, captured by 
Schlegel’s description, was that they were doctrinaire ideologues whose primary 
interest was in determining whether others had the “right” political perspectives. 
See id. For more on the history of the National Lawyers’ Guild, see HARVEY 
KLEHR, THE HEYDAY OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM (1984); ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY 
ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998).  
 66. Schlegel, supra note 4, at 399. 
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that their presence might spawn intellectual disagreements 
that would spill over into social ones and result in the 
Conference becoming fractious.67 The second was excluded 
because it was thought that their presence would distract 
those singled out for invitation to the Conference in attacks 
on liberalism which would “inhibit development of the 
group’s own distinctive approaches to law.”68 And while, 
after the first meeting, the Conference adopted an “open 
door” rather than an “invitation only” posture towards 
annual meetings,69 the searching critiques launched at 
established law and social science scholars at the first 
meeting resulted in an estrangement of member of the Law 
and Society Association from the Conference and thus a 
“conspicuous failure” of the “rapprochement Trubek and 
Kennedy sought with the law and social science group.”70 
Meanwhile “traditional liberals” tended to “avoid [the 
Conference] like the plague,” and the organizers’ instinct to 
avoid “Guild types” may have been confirmed when a paper 
presented at the second annual Conference, at Northeastern 
Law School in 1978, was “viciously . . . attacked for having 
nothing to do with ‘the working class.’”71 
Once again, in Schlegel’s narrative, people and places 
are playing a central role, and ideas are secondary. It is less 
important for him who may have “won” debates between 
Critical Marxists and proponents of law and social science at 
the first meeting than the personal dimensions of those 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. Schlegel recounts an amusing incident in which Harry Wellington, 
then Dean of Yale Law School, protested to Duncan Kennedy about the exclusion 
of members of the Yale faculty, believing that the Conference organizers did not 
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 69. Id. at 400. 
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debates, which caused some members of the law and social 
science group to denounce their critics and others to feel that 
they were not “wanted” in the organization.72 When ideology 
does seem to be central, as in the attack by a “Guild type” on 
a paper for being insufficiently attentive to class control of 
the means of production, Schlegel implies that sort of posture 
is counterproductive.  
In the end people, and to a lesser extent places and 
institutions, seem to be what Schlegel believes the 
Conference is fundamentally about. We learn about Peter 
Gabel’s “curly black locks and earnest, terminally tired eyes” 
as well as his “wonderfully dense and contorted prose.”73 We 
glimpse the “balding, almost elfin” Morton Horwitz as he 
“embarrassedly defend[s] his latest attempt to salvage his 
limited version of the socioeconomic determinism of legal 
ideas.”74 We witness members of the group, in successive 
annual meetings, “trading pictures of one’s children” and 
“spotting a few old friends,” after which “the hugs, kisses, 
and handshakes start.”75 We deplore the absence from a 
meeting of Alan Freeman, “whose manic energy and 
relentless optimism has surely infected everyone,”76 or Karl 
Klare, “a wonderful combination of high seriousness and 
warm, open goodwill,”77 or Rand Rosenblatt, “whose bald 
Lenin-like profile gives the impression of a fierceness that is 
simply nowhere to be found in his humane inside.”78 All this 
means, for Schlegel, that the Conference on Critical Legal 
Studies should be best understood as “a group of individuals 
providing each other with tremendous mutual support.”79 So 
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in the end the “history” of the Conference is another 
illustration of “ideas and people” being “hopelessly 
intermingled.” 
III 
Part of the reason Schlegel’s 1984 narrative about the 
Conference remains cited and anthologized over thirty years 
after it appeared is that it makes a strong case for Schlegel’s 
view that intellectual history is the history of intellectuals, 
primarily affected by people, places, and institutions. 
Schlegel’s narrative of the Conference represents a slight 
exception to his intellectual work as a whole in that the 
substance of ideas can occasionally be glimpsed behind the 
sketches of personalities discussing them and the social 
atmospheres in which they are discussed. Critical Marxism, 
Scientific Marxism, and non-Marxist law and social science 
are somewhat encapsulated, so when one imagines Mark 
Tushnet and Stewart Macaulay, still colleagues at Wisconsin 
in the mid-1980s, off in a corner debating whether American 
legal institutions can only profitably be understood as objects 
of a capitalist order, one has some inkling of the “Scientific 
Marxist” and law and social science perspectives informing 
that debate. But despite his occasional efforts to set forth the 
principal ideas being tossed around in the three-cornered 
game of catch being played at Conferences, one still has the 
sense that Schlegel thinks it more important that “the quite 
tentative, very cliquish, even conspiratorial beginning of the 
Conference seems to have passed,”80 and “the group has 
become incredibly friendly, even clubby,” with “annual 
meetings becom[ing] much like the gathering of a clan.”81 
Schlegel wants his readers to conclude that that 
development is not only “good,”82 but important, for the 
history of  Critical Legal Studies will be, at bottom, the 
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history of the people in it.  
I have a good deal of admiration for Schlegel’s ability to 
provide telling details in the sketches of “intellectuals” whose 
history he recounts. Learning that Peter Gabel and Alan 
Freeman smoked “big black cigars” in a “secluded corner of 
David Trubek’s yard” during the first Conference, or that 
Trubek and Roberto Unger, “seated in a peacock chair,” 
talked “South American politics,” either in Spanish or 
Portuguese, at the same event,83 is perhaps a better way to 
grasp the atmosphere of the first Conference than noting 
that versions of Scientific Marxism, Critical Marxism, and 
non-Marxist law and social science were deployed by 
participants. But then one needs to recall, as part of the 
history of Critical Legal Studies, that sometime in the late 
1980s the Critical Legal Studies movement did not actually 
run into the sand, but certainly ran out of steam in the legal 
academy, and the reason for that was not that Duncan 
Kennedy and David Trubek and Mark Tushnet and the 
movement’s other founders became supporters of Ronald 
Reagan or retired to the Florida Gold Coast, but because two 
things happened to the central ideas of the movement.  
One was that one of the principal methodological 
innovations of Critical Legal Studies—popularized as the 
“trashing” or “flipping” of established legal doctrines so as to 
show their internal contradictions and possibly their 
incoherence—was adopted by law teachers who did not share 
the group’s political leanings. By using those techniques 
critical legal scholars had reinstituted the centrality of 
doctrinal analysis to law teaching, and “mainstream” legal 
academics piggy-backed on that emphasis, at the same time 
developing more sophisticated ways to unpack legal doctrine. 
Thus one of the major critical weapons of CLS scholars, 
deconstructing the doctrinal structure of “liberal” 
scholarship and teaching, was domesticated.84  
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Another innovation of critical scholars had been the 
“turn to history” in their work, mainly to show the 
contingency and time-boundedness of established doctrinal 
formulations. Other scholars began to participate in that 
historical turn, but with quite different normative agendas 
from those affiliated with CLS, so that “doing history” came 
to have a far less radical thrust within the legal academy, 
further contributing to the domestication of CLS 
methodologies.85  
Alongside that domestication came an estrangement of 
many legal academics from the political goals of Critical 
Legal Studies. The relentlessly anti-hierarchical thrust of 
the movement seemed to point in the direction of challenges 
to any activities within the legal academy that seemed 
“authoritarian,” even if they took the form of delegating some 
institutional decisions to committees or Deans. 
Confrontation, debate, and defiance of authority appeared to 
be goals of the CLS movement with respect to law school 
governance, and many legal academics found those goals 
tiresome or even exhausting. The CLS slogan that “Law Is 
Politics” may have seemed energizing to those attracted to 
the movement, but it seemed to invite an abandonment of the 
concept of “merit” which had played a decisive role in 
twentieth-century legal education. If one could not 
confidently say that some students were better than others, 
or some scholarship “worth more” than others, or even that 
law faculty deserved to be paid better than custodians, it 
seemed hard to imagine how law schools could effectively 
function. After an initial counter-move to oppose critically-
inspired proposals and even purge some untenured critical 
scholars from law faculties, the legal academy, in the 1990s, 
settled into a posture in which CLS methodologies became 
widely adopted in scholarship and teaching and CLS political 
proposals were largely ignored or forgotten. 
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That brief history suggests that the partial eclipse of 
CLS in the legal academy around the turn of the twentieth 
century was not primarily a function of people, places, or 
institutions. To be sure, there was a highly publicized 
interval of polarization on the Harvard law faculty, where 
opponents of CLS emerged and for a time tenure decisions 
and appointments were affected by open political divisions.86 
But in the end CLS was partially embraced, and partially 
rejected, by most American law faculties because of the ideas 
associated with the movement. Schlegel’s effort to encourage 
us to understand the Conference on Critical Legal Studies as 
part of a “history of intellectuals” presents us, like much of 
his work, with riveting personal and institutional portraits, 
but ultimately one worries, in scholarship purporting to do 
intellectual history, where the ideas are. Put another way, 
Schlegel’s emphasis on persons, places, and institutions has 
the effect of subsuming ideas in those topics, so that 
Schlegel’s narrative history becomes not so much one of 
“ideas and people, hopelessly intermingled,” but of ideas 
peeking around the portraits of people and places, mainly 
being lost from sight.87 
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